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ABSTRACT 
Injunctions are supposed to be among the most 
extraordinary remedies in the American judicial system, yet they 
have become anything but rare in trademark litigation. Although 
the unique nature of trademark protection may explain the 
frequency of injunctive relief, the process by which this relief is 
issued is rapidly devolving into rubber-stamping by the courts. 
This iBrief argues that courts should (1) recommit themselves to 
the principles of equity before granting injunctions and (2) 
seriously apply the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid overly broad orders.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Federal judges presiding over trademark disputes are handing out 
injunctions like candy, and the orders they are writing are sloppy, broad, 
and nonspecific. Outside the intellectual property context, courts tend to 
remedy wrongs by granting monetary relief after the damage has been 
done; they do not issue orders demanding that such wrong never be 
committed again.2 Trademark law, however, generally protects a party’s 
right to certain words or symbols via injunctions.3  Violating such an 
order carries severe penalties. 4  While courts must clearly protect 
trademark rights, to think that an individual could serve jail time in 
                                                     
1  B.A., summa cum laude, English and Latin, Ursinus College, 2004; J.D. 
Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2007. I am deeply indebted to the 
editing prowess of Professor Catherine Fisk and Garrett Levin, and I also thank 
Professor Arti Rai for her helpful research suggestions. All errors and omissions 
are of course my own. 
2 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) (“Specific 
performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate 
to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.”). 
3 See TERENCE P. ROSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND 
REMEDIES § 11.01 (repl. 2005). 
4 See 19 FED. PROC., L. ED. §41:1 (2000). 
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contempt of court for merely using words is unquestionably a jarring 
proposition.5 
¶2 This iBrief does not propose the abolition of injunctions. Indeed, 
even were this iBrief’s suggestions adopted in their entirety, injunctions 
would likely still be issued in the majority of infringement cases. U.S. 
trademark laws exist first and foremost to protect consumers, 6  and 
enjoining infringement may offer the best means of accomplishing that 
goal. Nevertheless, injunctions are not the only available means, nor are 
they legislatively mandated.7 
¶3 The readily assumed reliance on injunctive relief is neither ideal 
nor absolutely necessary. Presently, trademark injunctions are flawed in 
both the process by which they are issued and the form they ultimately 
take. The assumption that damages are either incalculable or undesirable 
has effectively eviscerated the four-part test for injunctions developed at 
common law to provide ex ante protection from abuse. This is, however, 
far from an unassailable assumption, and courts should reconsider 
monetary remedies. Much more importantly, courts need not and should 
not abandon the traditional factors that have guided the issuance of 
injunctions for centuries. 
¶4 Second, because courts have become so willing to issue 
trademark injunctions, many of the orders they compose consist of 
boilerplate, formulaic restatements of the law that offer the trademark 
infringer no meaningful guidance about what action is being enjoined. 
Appellate courts should therefore rigorously apply Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(d)8 and demand increased specificity in equitable remedies 
issued in intellectual property litigation. If in fact injunctions are to be 
the usual remedy, the ex post protections of Rule 65(d) must be upheld 
more vigilantly to prevent unfairness to both trademark holders and 
infringers. 
¶5 The underlying consumer protection theory of trademark law 
will unavoidably result in the frequent use of injunctions. Because of, not 
in spite of, their necessary frequency, courts should exercise the greatest 
                                                     
5 The threat of jail time is certainly low, but it brings a significant coercive 
effect. 
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (“The intent of this chapter is . . . to prevent fraud 
and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, 
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks . . . .”). 
7 The Lanham Act vests courts with the power to issue injunctions according to 
the traditional principles of equity; it does not require their use. 15 U.S.C. § 
1116 (2000). The Act also gives courts broad discretionary powers to determine 
monetary damages in trademark cases. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). 
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). 
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care in granting injunctions in trademark law, both in deciding when to 
issue them and in what form. 
I. TAKE THE TIME (DO IT RIGHT): THE EX ANTE PROTECTION OF 
THE FOUR-FACTOR TEST 
¶6 Injunctions are often noted as the most common remedy in 
trademark litigation.9 This is a serious understatement: Injunctions tend 
to be the only remedy in trademark litigation. Although the Lanham Act 
explicitly provides for both injunctive10 and monetary11 relief, damages 
are extremely difficult to obtain—more difficult than in any other field of 
intellectual property. 12  This difficulty, combined with consumer 
protection principles, has led to injunctions’ becoming the remedy of 
choice, which in turn has led to their abuse. 
¶7 Courts granted injunctions in seventy percent of the available 
federal district court trademark opinions from 2005 in which the court 
specifically considered the question of whether to grant an injunction.13 
Of the thirty percent of opinions denying injunctions, nearly all were 
denials of preliminary injunctions where the plaintiff failed to show a 
likelihood of success. 14  Last year, no federal district court denied an 
                                                     
9 See, e.g., Mont. Prof’l Sports, LLC v. Leisure  Sports Mgmt., Inc., No. 
CIVA605CV1827ORL18DA, 2006 WL 289111, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2006); 
Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Corp. 376 F. Supp. 2d 251, 265 (D. R.I. 
2005); Adam Brookman, Trademark Law Protection, Enforcement and 
Licensing § 9.05[A] (repl. 2005); 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:2 (4th ed., repl. 2005). 
10 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000). 
11 Id. § 1117(a). 
12 ROSS, supra note 3, § 4.01. 
13 This data is based on a survey of all available federal district court opinions on 
trademark infringement claims in 2005. This data set excludes cases where the 
court dismissed trademark infringement claims under Rules 12(b)(6) or 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even if the plaintiff may ultimately have been 
seeking an injunction. In other words, the data only includes opinions and orders 
where the court was asked to address the specific question of whether or not to 
grant a permanent or preliminary injunction. In total, there were sixty-seven 
cases that fit the criteria. 
14 This thirty percent includes several opinions that declined to grant injunctions 
for technical reasons or because the defendant successfully petitioned the court 
for a new trial. See Fibermark, Inc. v. Brownville Specialty Paper Prods., Inc., 
No. Civ.A. 7:02-CV-0517, 2005 WL 3359077 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2005) 
(denying permanent injunction where ordering a new trial); Gilson v. Rainin 
Instrument, LLC, No. 04-C-852-S, 2005 WL 1899472 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2005) 
(denying plaintiff’s request for an injunction where jury award included no such 
relief); Am. Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Wis. 2005) 
(denying an ex parte preliminary injunction because it was doubtful whether 
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injunction where the trademark holder had demonstrated actual or likely 
success on the merits of its infringement claim. The import of this data is 
that in the context of trademarks, injunctions are not extraordinary 
remedies; they are the de facto remedies. Moreover, the data indicate 
(and a more thorough review of the opinions confirms) that trademark 
remedies, as granted by the courts, are divorced from the positive law 
that authorized such remedies in the first place. The Lanham Act offers 
courts the “power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of 
equity . . . .” 15  In other words, the statute directs courts to apply 
injunctions in this area under the same doctrines that guide injunctions 
generally.16 A comparison of the traditional principles and approach in 
trademark law devastatingly demonstrates how far courts have digressed. 
A. A Brief Review of Injunctions Generally 
¶8 Injunctions, which are in personam orders demanding 
compliance under threat of contempt, trace their roots to Ancient 
                                                                                                                       
court had personal jurisdiction over defendant); Santa Fe Props., Inc. v. French 
& French Fine Props., Inc., No. CIV 04-0518, 2005 WL 2313680 (D. N.M. Aug. 
9, 2005) (denying relief where plaintiff requested an injunction for the first time 
in a reply brief); Tony Jones Apparel, Inc. v. Indigo USA, LLC, No. 03 C 0280, 
2005 WL 1667789 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 11, 2005) (denying injunction where defendant 
corporation was defunct); Cruising Co., Etc., Inc. v. Mahnken Enters., Inc., No. 
C05632P, 2005 WL 1354532 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 6, 2005) (denying preliminary 
injunction due to factual inconsistencies in record).. See Fibermark, Inc. v. 
Brownville Specialty Paper Prods., Inc., No. Civ.A. 7:02-CV-0517, 2005 WL 
3359077 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2005) (denying permanent injunction where 
ordering a new trial); Gilson v. Rainin Instrument, LLC, No. 04-C-852-S, 2005 
WL 1899472 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2005) (denying plaintiff’s request for an 
injunction where jury award included no such relief); Am. Girl, LLC v. 
Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (denying an ex parte 
preliminary injunction because it was doubtful whether court had personal 
jurisdiction over defendant); Santa Fe Props., Inc. v. French & French Fine 
Props., Inc., No. CIV 04-0518, 2005 WL 2313680 (D. N.M. Aug. 9, 2005) 
(denying relief where plaintiff requested an injunction for the first time in a 
reply brief); Tony Jones Apparel, Inc. v. Indigo USA, LLC, No. 03 C 0280, 
2005 WL 1667789 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 11, 2005) (denying injunction where defendant 
corporation was defunct); Cruising Co., Etc., Inc. v. Mahnken Enters., Inc., No. 
C05632P, 2005 WL 1354532 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 6, 2005) (denying preliminary 
injunction due to factual inconsistencies in record). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). 
16 Cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (requiring an 
indication from congress before assuming courts will be denied customary 
equitable discretion). 
  
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 13 
Rome, 17  and since then courts have never granted them ex debito 
justitiae or as a matter of right.18 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
called injunctions “extraordinary remed[ies],”19  and remarked that the 
associated judicial contempt power is a “potent” and “deadly” weapon.20  
Some legal scholars have even raised concern about constitutional issues 
occasioned by enjoining speech.21 Others acknowledge a broader danger. 
One judge, writing in 1830, warned: 
There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which 
requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more 
dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing [of] an injunction; it 
is the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended unless to 
cases of great injury, where the courts of law cannot afford an 
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.22  
¶9 Despite the merger of law and equity, U.S. courts maintain many 
distinctions between legal and equitable remedies and the availability of 
each.23  Under these principles, monetary damages “are considered an 
adequate remedy in all but the most extraordinary cases.” 24  In other 
words, if the plaintiff’s wrong can be rectified by money, the court will 
not issue an injunction. 
¶10 That overarching principle has engendered a four-factor test to 
determine if an injunction is an appropriate and permissible remedy. 
Before issuing injunctive relief, a court must consider:  
1. the likelihood of irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff in the absence of an injunction;  
2. whether the likelihood of that harm is 
outweighed by the likelihood of harm to the 
defendant if the injunction were granted;  
                                                     
17 See generally A. H. J. GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF CICERO’S TIME 
210–27 (1971). 
18 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 16 (2d ed. 1869). 
19 United States v. Oakland Cannibis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 496 (2001) 
(quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). 
20 Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n., Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assn., 
389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967). 
21 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
22 Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (No. 
1,617). 
23 RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., MODERN REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL 
PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES 17 (1997). 
24 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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3. the success of the plaintiff on the merits (or 
the likelihood of success in the case of a 
preliminary injunction); and  
4. the general public interest.25  
¶11 This test provides protection to the defendant ex ante. The first 
factor is the natural byproduct of the general principle that equity will not 
aid one with an adequate remedy at law. Thus, the damage must be 
irreparable—the sort absolutely incapable of mending by mere money.26 
The second factor, the balance of the hardships, and the fourth factor, the 
public interest, represent a tacit acknowledgement that injunctions are 
extremely powerful and underscore the universal reach of equity.  
¶12 In addition to the obvious burdens they impose on defendants,27 
injunctions levy significant costs on plaintiffs and the judicial system as 
a whole. If the defendant ignores or violates an order, the plaintiff must 
institute a contempt proceeding,28  and the losing party may appeal.29 
These proceedings tax both the parties and the courts in time and money. 
Moreover, Professor Standen has suggested that frequent use of 
injunctions undesirably shifts risk-analysis burdens to plaintiffs and 
judges.30 
¶13 Despite the long history of these protective principles and the 
incidental costs of injunctions, the frequency with which the remedies 
are issued belies the strength of the four-factor test. 31  Numerous 
commentators, citing both descriptive and normative reasons, have called 
for the end of the inadequate remedy at law / irreparable injury rule in all 
                                                     
25 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Products, Inc., 183 F.3d 
10, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999); Cf. ROSS, supra note 3, § 11.02[1][b] (noting that two 
circuits follow a slightly different formulation, where a “party seeking injunctive 
relief must show: (1) that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction; and (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits, or sufficiently 
serious questions going to the merits make them a fair ground for litigation, and 
a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor”). 
26 E.g., Pappan Enters. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
27 See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 398 (2005) (“Violation of a valid injunction . . .  
constitutes a contempt of court and is punishable as such.”). See also id. § 438 
(“[O]ne who violates an injunction is liable to punishment by fine or 
imprisonment.”) (footnotes omitted). 
28 Id. § 423. 
29 Id. § 433. 
30 Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 
161–62 (1995). 
31 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 5 
(1991). 
  
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 13 
areas of law.32 Nevertheless, even those who have called for reform in 
this area acknowledge that there is a fundamental need for some limit on 
the availability of injunctions. 33  The modern significance of the 
irreparable injury rule is that injunctions are powerful, costly, and can be 
inefficient if overused. This is precisely the point being largely 
overlooked in trademark law. 
B. The Test for Issuing an Injunction in Trademark Law 
¶14 While the four-factor test described above is still used with force 
in other substantive areas of law, 34  the gradual rise of certain 
presumptions has enfeebled the test in trademark law. 
¶15 With only one exception, every federal court of appeals has a 
presumption of irreparable harm once the trademark owner has 
successfully proven a likelihood of success on the merits at the 
preliminary injunction level. 35  Where the court is contemplating a 
permanent injunction, the plaintiff’s actual success will be sufficient to 
presume irreparable harm.36 
¶16 There have been several explanations offered for why courts 
may presume irreparable harm in the context of trademark disputes. The 
most popular of these theories is inadequacy of monetary relief where the 
                                                     
32 See, e.g., id. passim; Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal 
Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 381 passim (2005). Still, despite Dean Laycock’s copious 
research to the contrary, LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 23–24, not all judges are 
sounding the death knell of the irreparable injury rule. See, for example, 
Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1266–77 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., 
concurring), for powerful, recent evidence that the rule continues to influence 
judicial reasoning significantly. See also Power Mobility Coal. v. Leavitt, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d 190, 204–05 (D.D.C. 2005). 
33 See e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 33, at 268–69 (setting out a tentative 
restatement that maintains a balancing of the respective hardships and 
consideration of the public interest). 
34 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S.  Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. Civ.A. 05-1724JAP, 
2005 WL 2090028, at *19–*20 (D.N.J. Aug 19, 2005) (denying preliminary 
injunction where balance of hardships favored defendant and public interest 
militated against injunctive relief); Taylor v. McCollom, 958 P.2d 207, 213–14 
(Or. Ct. App. 1998) (denying injunctive relief where the balance of hardships 
tipped in defendants’ favor). 
35 ROSS, supra note 3, § 11.05[1] (commenting that the Fifth Circuit has not 
directly addressed the issue of a presumption of irreparable harm in the context 
of trademark litigation); see, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 
F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992). 
36 See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v.  Lundberg, No. Civ. 02-948-HA, 2005 WL 
3183858, at *13 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2005). 
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injury is loss of customers and goodwill.37 Courts have stated that loss of 
goodwill can grow and magnify, making the harm incalculable. Such a 
conclusion is attractive for the sake of simplicity, but it is certainly not a 
hard-and-fast rule. There are numerous approaches to valuation in 
intellectual property; to assume that damage to goodwill as a result of 
consumer confusion is unquantifiable defies abundant research.38 Indeed, 
one’s reputation, once damaged, is unquestionably difficult to restore, 
but in libel law a preliminary injunction is an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on free speech. 39  More importantly, difficulty in quantifying 
damage does not an irreparable injury make: harm is not irreparable 
simply because damages are complicated. Valuation in trademark 
disputes is by no means simple, but to presume irreparable injury is to 
forfeit before the game has begun. 
¶17  Moreover, many courts have in fact issued monetary damage 
awards in trademark disputes. The Seventh Circuit, for example, upheld 
a jury award of $4.3 million for trademark infringement in a case where 
no injunction was issued.40 The plaintiff held a trademark on a particular 
greeting card design that it licensed for some time to the defendant.41 
After the expiration of the agreement, the defendant released its own line 
of greeting cards that were found to infringe.42 Both parties produced 
expert testimony on the amount of profit derived from sales of the 
infringing product, with estimates ranging from approximately $5 
                                                     
37 See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 
1998) (finding irreparable injury where a franchisee sold substandard meat as a 
genuine McDonald’s burger);  S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 
371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]rademark infringement amounts to irreparable 
injury as a matter of law.”). 
38 See generally MARTIN A. GLICK ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES: 
GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS (2003); GORDON V. SMITH, TRADEMARK 
VALUATION (1997) (discussing numerous valuation techniques, including 
market, cost, and income approaches). In fact, courts already must value harm of 
this sort in setting the bond amount required by Rule 65 when issuing a 
preliminary injunction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
39 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 23, at 204. To equate consumer confusion 
with damage to reputation,  as many do, see, e.g., Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. 
Specktacular Pizza, Inc., No. Civ.A. 305CV515H, 2005 WL 3132337, at *4 
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2005) (noting that infringement threatens a mark holder’s 
reputation and constitutes irreparable injury), would open up a host of relevant 
constitutional challenges that are beyond the scope of this iBrief. 
40 Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989). 
41 Id. at 934. 
42 Id. at 935. 
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million to $40,000, and the jury, free to disregard all such calculations, 
found relief in the amount of $4.3 million.43 
¶18 No one contends that the jury process is error-proof, but it is the 
same process taken in other substantive areas of law.44 If one goal of 
trademark law is deterrence of infringement, there remains no clear 
reason to deny the purposeful effects of sizeable jury awards. Courts 
routinely deny injunctions in real and personal property law, requiring 
injured parties be content with monetary relief.45 Thus, there exists good 
reason to believe that not all injuries occasioned by trademark 
infringement are per se irreparable—the presumption of irreparable harm 
throughout the circuits represents perhaps a lack of understanding of or 
an unwillingness to engage in traditional or experimental methods of 
valuation. 
¶19 A more persuasive argument for the presumption of irreparable 
harm focuses on the underlying theory of trademark law and suggests 
that the harm is to the public rather than the mark holder. Modern 
trademark law stems from the common law tort of deceit.46  The real 
purpose of a trademark is not to show that a particular product is made 
by XYZ simply for the sake of showing source. Rather, the aim is to 
provide consistency for the consumer who has previously purchased and 
been satisfied by a product bearing the mark XYZ.47 When another firm 
labels its product as XYZ, the real damage is to the consumer, who 
reasonably expects that this second product will be of the same quality 
and from the same source as the first. No amount of money paid to the 
real XYZ can undo such damage to the customer, and, hence, there is 
irreparable injury. 
¶20 There are, however, three key reasons why this argument does 
not support a presumption of irreparable harm. First, to succeed in an 
infringement claim, the mark holder need only prove a likelihood of 
confusion. 48  The mere possibility of confusion does not justify a 
                                                     
43 Id. at 941. 
44 See James Thompson, Note, Permanent Injunctions in Copyright 
Infringement: Moral and Economic Justifications for Balancing Individual 
Rights Instead of Following Harsh Rules, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 477, 494 
(1998). 
45 See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 109 (2004) (“Equity has, in most cases, no 
jurisdiction over simple acts of trespass.”) (footnote omitted). 
46 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813, 819 (1926). 
47 Cf. id. at 818. 
48 E.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 459 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is 
black letter law that actual confusion need not be shown to prevail under the 
Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove and the Act 
  
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 13 
presumption of irreparable harm that procedurally encourages the court 
to forego analysis of the actual damage. Second, consumer confusion 
may not irreparably harm anyone. If an infringing firm is in fact making 
a product of the same quality and function as the product whose mark it 
infringes, the consumer is not harmed at all. In such a case there is 
certainly injury to the mark holder via loss of profit, but this is 
compensable by damages and is therefore by definition reparable. A 
trademark does not bestow a property right on its holder.49 The modern 
trend of “propertizing” trademarks, as Professor Lemley writes, is a 
marked departure from the law’s consumer protection underpinnings.50 
Third, and most importantly, the plaintiff mark holder is not the 
irreparably injured party under this analysis. While the confused 
consumer lacks the standing to make a claim against an infringer,51 the 
legislature’s determination to withhold standing does not lead naturally 
to the conclusion that the mark holder adequately represents her interests. 
It would be odd and unfair for the court to presume a particular kind of 
harm to an abstract party not presently before the court. 
¶21 The irreparable harm requirement is not the only component of 
the four-factor test that has been undermined in trademark law. Although 
the circuits routinely state the need to balance the hardships to each party 
caused by the issuance or denial of an injunction, 52  the actual work 
various courts do to balance the equities is dubious at best.  
                                                                                                                       
requires only a likelihood of confusion as to source.”) (quoting Lois Sportswear, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986)).
49 See Bonito  Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) 
(“The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: 
its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. 
While that concern may result in the creation of ‘quasi-property rights’ in 
communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the 
protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.”). 
50 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1694–97 (1999); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We 
Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? 
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
123, 128 (1996). 
51 Mark A. Kahn, May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-Trademark 
Uses of Sports Logos, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 283, 289 (2004). A consumer may, 
however, bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000), albeit not for 
infringement. 
52 See, e.g., Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 
532, 537 (2d Cir. 2005); Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of 
Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 126 (3d Cir. 2004); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan 
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1016 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004); Scotts Co. v. United 
Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2002); Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear 
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¶22 Certainly, some courts have diligently worked through this 
factor. The Third Circuit, in KOS Pharmaceuticals., Inc. v. ANDRX 
Corp.,53 reversed a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in a 
trademark infringement dispute.54 The court devoted considerable space 
to working through the various hardships alleged by the defendant, 
conducting a more thorough review while granting the injunction than 
did the district court that denied it. 55  Although ultimately deciding 
against the defendant, the court implicitly acknowledged that loss of 
market share represents a proper consideration in the balancing test; this 
hardship was mitigated by the fact that the preliminary injunction would 
only require the defendant to abandon its product name until final 
resolution on the merits.56 
¶23 Even though the Third Circuit did not find the balance of the 
hardships in favor of the defendant, the consideration given to its claims 
does suggest that the court recognized the force and impact of equitable 
remedies. Unfortunately, KOS Pharmaceuticals does not represent the 
norm. First, many courts, even when reciting the need to balance the 
hardships, spend little or no time actually considering the impact and 
damage done by injunctions.57 Second, and more pervasive, most courts, 
                                                                                                                       
Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1170 (11th Cir. 2002); N. Light Tech., 
Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Lloyd 
Design Corp., 22 F. App’x 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2001); Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, 
Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001); Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed 
Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. 
Reebok Int’l Ltd. 998 F.2d 985, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Lever Bros. Co. v. U.S., 
877 F.2d 101, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 
F.2d 656, 661 (10th Cir. 1987). 
53 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2004). 
54 Id. at 703. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 729. 
57 See, e.g., Am. Equity  Mortgage, Inc. v. Vinson, No. 4:05CV1529 RWS, 2005 
WL 3372781, at *1–*2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2005); MetLife, Inc. v. Metro. Nat’l. 
Bank, 388 F. Supp. 2d 223, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 
386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Schick Mfg., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 
372 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (D. Conn. 2005); DaVinci Tech. Corp. v. Rubino, No. 
Civ. 05-1561, 2005 WL 1249462, at *9 (D. N.J. May 25, 2005) (“[T]he strong 
showing of irreparable injury to Plaintiff clearly outweighs any potential harm to 
Defendants and thus tips the equities in its favor.”); City Bonding Co., Inc. v. 
Hauther, No. 3:05CV90, 2005 WL 1159431, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. May 17, 2005); 
Abercrombie & Fitch v. Fashion Shops of Kentucky, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 952, 
958 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Perfection Fence Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, No. 
Civ.A. 04-12094-GAO, 2005 WL 353017, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2005); 
Connelly v. ValueVision Media, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (D. Minn. 2005) 
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including the Third Circuit, balance the hardships on a sliding scale that 
holds “[t]he more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the 
balance of harms to weigh in his favor.”58  
¶24 This sliding-scale analysis, when used aggressively, rips the 
heart out of the balancing inquiry in the traditional four-factor test for 
injunctions. There are far too many examples of this unfortunate doctrine 
to even begin assembling a comprehensive list, although a great number 
offer potent illustrations. In Resource Lenders, Inc. v. Source Solutions, 
Inc., the District Court for the Eastern District of California explained 
that “once likelihood of confusion is established, it is usually presumed 
that the Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm and that the balance of 
hardships tips in Plaintiff's favor.”59 The court summarized the parties’ 
arguments on this point in a meager paragraph and did not analyze 
them. 60  To conduct a balancing test without balancing anything is 
laughable—yet this is precisely the approach adopted by the court. 
¶25 In fact, Resource Lenders and other cases go even further. Most 
district courts have also collapsed the public interest factor into the 
likelihood of success factor.61 The leading case on this point comes from 
the Third Circuit, stating that in the context of trademark litigation, 
public interest is just “a synonym for the right of the public not to be 
deceived or confused.” 62  Following this logic, Resource Lenders 
addressed the fourth factor of the injunction test in a single sentence: 
“Here, because a likelihood of confusion was demonstrated, the public 
interest would be served by issuance of an injunction.”63 For a law with 
the purpose of protecting the public, the actual consideration of the 
public’s interest—and not just a conclusory statement thereon—would 
seem necessary. 
                                                                                                                       
(“[B]ecause Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of confusion in the 
marketplace, the balance of harms tips in their favor.”).
58 KOS Pharms., 369 F.3d at 729 (quoting Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 597 (3d Cir. 
2002); see also Manpower, Inc. v. Manson, 405 F. Supp. 2d 959 (E.D. Wis. 
2005). 
59 404 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1249 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
60 Id. 
61 ROSS, supra note 3, § 11.05[3][c].  
62 Optician’s Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
63 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1250;see also Connelly v. ValueVision Media, Inc., 393 F. 
Supp. 2d 767, 777 (D. Minn. 2005) (“The Court finds that since it has already 
determined that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits of its trademark infringement claim, the public interest is best served by 
issuing a preliminary injunction. Infringement of a trademark is inherently 
contrary to the public interest.”). 
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¶26 In sum, injunctions in trademark disputes are guided by the 
traditional four-factor test (likelihood of success; irreparable harm; 
balance of hardships; and public interest) as modified in the following 
ways: 
1. Irreparable harm is presumed; 
2. A plaintiff need not show that the balance of 
the hardships tips significantly in its favor 
where it has demonstrated a likelihood of 
success on the merits; and 
3. The public interest is served by injunctions 
where the plaintiff has demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits. 
¶27 As such, the four-factor test, which was developed to provide ex 
ante protections against the abuses associated with over-issuance of 
injunctions, now turns almost entirely on one factor: the likelihood of 
success on the merits.  
C. Why this matters—a hypothetical 
¶28 Imagine that Bi-Goxx Pharmaceuticals has committed the 
majority of its resources to researching a rare form of skin cancer and 
that there are reasonable indications that it is close to a profound 
breakthrough treatment. The research, however, is time-sensitive, and 
any delay could derail the project. During this time, Bi-Goxx is sued 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) for trademark infringement by Big-Oxx 
Chemical Co., a company that develops and manufactures cleaning 
chemicals. Big-Oxx has a registered trademark in its logo, which is its 
name in a sans-serif, italicized, blue font presented in a green oval. Bi-
Goxx, which came into existence after Big-Oxx, uses a remarkably 
similar logo, the only true differences being capitalization, the placement 
of the hyphen, and minor differences in color tone.64 The two companies 
share some, but few, purchasers, both advertise extensively on the 
internet,65 and their print advertisements have both appeared in certain 
magazines. Big-Oxx became aware of Bi-Goxx when one of its long time 
                                                     
64 See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Comp., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that plaintiff's "GoTo" logo was infringed by defendant's "Go 
Network" logo, where both consisted of white capital letters in similar typeface 
on a green circle). 
65 See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that use of internet for marketing and 
advertisement is “a factor that courts have consistently recognized as 
exacerbating the likelihood of confusion”). 
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customers expressed confusion over a Bi-Goxx ad on cancer research 
that the purchaser mistook for a Big-Oxx ad.66 
¶29 Bi-Goxx is concerned that its present financial condition cannot 
support prolonged litigation, but Big-Oxx has refused to settle out of 
court. Because of its excitement about what appears to be an imminent 
breakthrough on skin cancer, Bi-Goxx recently spent considerable funds 
on developing marketing materials, all of which use the allegedly 
infringing logo. Bi-Goxx cannot afford to hire an artist to create a new 
logo, to reproduce these materials, to develop a new website, and 
continue to fund, uninterrupted, the skin cancer research. Big-Oxx, 
however, has moved the court for a preliminary order enjoining Bi-Goxx 
from using the allegedly infringing logo. Although it can prove only one 
instance of actual consumer confusion and cannot show bad intent on the 
part of Bi-Goxx, Big-Oxx can probably show a likelihood of success on 
the merits of its infringement claim or can at least raise sufficiently 
serious questions going to the merits.  
¶30 Under the traditional principles of equity, no injunction would 
issue. Bi-Goxx will argue that the issuance of an injunction imposes 
significant irreparable harm because the financial burden of altering its 
marketing will likely derail its time-sensitive cancer research. The 
hardship suffered by Big-Oxx in the absence of an injunction, on the 
other hand, is not as serious. Big-Oxx is unable to prove any monetary 
damage as a result of the similar logos; it can only point to a nebulous 
potential for consumer confusion and one slightly confused customer. 
Finally, Bi-Goxx will invoke the public interest in cancer research that 
will be impeded by the injunction. 
¶31 In the present world where the court does not implement the 
traditional four-factor test, however, an injunction will issue upon a mere 
showing of a likelihood of confusion. Bi-Goxx will go bankrupt, and the 
breakthrough on skin cancer will be significantly delayed or even lost.  
¶32 The skeptical reader may at this point note two things: (1) courts 
have not eliminated the four-factor test entirely, and (2) this is an 
extreme example. Both are true. Nevertheless, one must remember that 
while courts presently do at least mention the four-factor test, there is 
serious concern that the law could change.67 Secondly, although this is 
                                                     
66 See AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 798 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“Evidence of actual confusion is undoubtedly the best evidence of likelihood of 
confusion.”). 
67 Cf. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., No. 05-130, cert. granted (U.S. Nov. 
28, 2005) (presenting question of whether injunctions are the “general rule” in 
patent law); see generally Donna Higgins, Supreme Court to hear eBay Patent 
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extreme, it is not implausible, and the principles behind remedies cannot 
be suited only to the lowest common denominator. In fact, we have such 
rules to ensure protection at the margins. 
¶33 The purpose of presumptions is to put a thumb on the scale of 
judicial analysis—to direct courts towards predetermined conclusions.68 
Presumptions make no sense in equity jurisprudence. Courts of equity 
(and, hence, equitable remedies) arose when courts of law were unable to 
effect complete justice because they were bound by rigid rules.69 In other 
words, equity exists to provide courts the freedom to operate outside 
inflexible boxes. The presumptions in trademark law regarding 
injunctions reconstruct the inflexible boxes equity seeks to avoid. In fact, 
the presumptions regarding the balance of harms and the public interest 
are destabilized by the meaning of the word equity itself. The word 
derives from the Latin aequitas, which, in it most basic form, means 
universality or uniformity.70 To issue an injunction without considering 
its effects broadly, therefore, is a dynamic departure from not only the 
                                                                                                                       
Case, FINDLAW, Dec. 6, 2005, 
http://news.lp.findlaw.com/andrews/bt/slb/20051206/20051206ebay.html. 
68 Cf. Joel Alan Fischman, Winstead v. Derreberry: Stepchildren and the 
Presumption of Dependence under the North  Carolina Workers' Compensation 
Act, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 1548, 1563 (1986) (“The very purpose of a presumption is 
to alleviate the need for a detailed consideration of the circumstances of each 
case.”). Presumptions are useful in situations where evidence is difficult or 
impossible to gather. In securities law, where a Rule 10b-5 action is predicated 
on a defendant’s omission of a material fact, the Court has noted that it would be 
impractical to require the plaintiff to prove reliance on something that was never 
said. Such reliance is, therefore, presumed. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th 
Cir. 1983). Because there is no reason why irreparable injury is any more 
difficult to prove in trademark law than in any other substantive area, there are 
no grounds for its presumption. 
69 See 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 2 (1996). The tension between the desire for 
flexibility and the desire to prevent unfettered power is longstanding. Equity 
requires the freedom to adequately address wrongs, yet there has long been 
recognized a need for guidance. Consider the juxtaposition of Cicero and 
Justinian. Cicero believed that law need not be limited to positive enactment: 
“non ergo a praetoris edicto, ut plerique nunc, neque a duodecim tabulis, ut 
superiores, sed penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam iuris disciplinam . . . 
.”—“The discipline of law must not be gathered from the praetor’s edict, as 
most now think, nor from the Twelve Tables, as they used to believe, but 
inwardly, from our innermost philosophy.” DE LEGIBUS I.v.17, available at 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/leg1.shtml#17. Law, he wrote, is a 
naturae vis—a force of nature. Id. at I.v.19. Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, on 
the other hand, is arguably an attempt to capture that naturae vis in a defined 
code. 
70 CHARLTON T. LEWIS, AN ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 35 (1891). 
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traditional “principles of equity,”71 but from the very notion of equity at 
all. 
¶34 The nature of trademark law may necessarily result in the 
frequent issuance of injunctive relief. Where there is a threat of 
continuous harm, injunctions make sense.72 Because trademark disputes 
often arise in such a context, injunctions seem entirely appropriate. 
Nevertheless, courts have long called injunctions “extraordinary 
remedies,” 73  and they have done so with purpose. “Extraordinary,” 
despite contemporary parlance, does not mean “great” or “amazing.” It 
means “unusual” or “rare.” 74  Thus, our judicial system has long 
considered injunctions “rare” remedies. To make them the axiomatic 
choice in trademark disputes contradicts their very nature. Even if they 
must represent the majority of remedies issued in trademark litigation, 
courts should neither abandon the four-factor test nor cripple it with 
unnecessary presumptions. Indeed, the example of Bi-Goxx and Big-Oxx 
is extreme and somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless, the traditional four-
factor test offers protection for those rare, extreme cases; we need such 
rules at the margins. The increased fairness in the substance of the 
subsequent orders will more than repay the effort spent considering each 
factor carefully. 
II. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS: THE EX POST PROTECTION OF 
RULE 65(D) 
¶35 With the decline of the ex ante protections of the four-factor test, 
there exists great danger that injunctions are being issued both 
excessively and sloppily. 75  To combat the latter problem, appellate 
                                                     
71 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000). 
72 See, e.g., U.S. v. Zenon, 711 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that an 
injunction is authorized to avoid a “‘multiplicity’ of legal actions”). 
73 See, e.g., Citizens Fin. Group, Inc. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 383 
F.3d 110, 126 (3d Cir. 2004). 
74 “Extraordinary” is derived from the Latin extraordinarius, which is extra 
(outside of) + ordo, ordinis (row, order, rank). In Roman law, most cases were 
framed by praetors, but issues of fact were decided by a judex or other lay 
person. This was ordinary jurisdiction (in ordinem). Eventually, there developed 
another form of jurisdiction, in which the praetor decided all issues of law and 
fact himself without adhering to the strict technical requirements. This was 
called extraordinary jurisdiction (extra ordinem because it was out of course or 
unusual).  1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 7–8 
(1881). 
75 See, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Corp. 376 F. Supp. 2d 251, 
265, 266–67 (D. R.I. 2005) (enjoining defendant “from using the OneBeacon 
name and lighthouse logo in  Rhode Island”); Lacey ex rel. Gaphic Commc’ns 
Int’l Union v. Big Impressions, Inc., No. 4:04CV00184SWW, 2005 WL 
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courts must police injunctions more zealously via the ex post protections 
of Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
¶36 Rule 65 in general covers very basic procedural requirements of 
issuing injunctions in the federal courts. Specifically, Rule 65(d) 
provides: 
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall 
set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall 
describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint 
or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. . . .76
¶37 The rule thus contains two key elements pertinent to this 
discussion: (1) the court must give a brief rationale for why the 
injunction is being imposed; and (2) the court must specifically and in 
reasonable detail describe what is being enjoined. Because the law of 
injunctions has such a full, complicated history, the drafters of the 
Federal Rules opted to depend almost entirely on the traditional 
principles of equity, and Rule 65(d) is no exception to this general 
approach. 77  Prior to the enactment of the federal rules, however, 
numerous injunctions were issued that were too vague to be 
comprehensible.78 It is exactly this sort of imprecision that Rule 65(d) 
seeks to address: “The drafting standard established by Rule 65(d) is that 
an ordinary person reading the court’s order should be able to ascertain 
from the document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed.”79 
¶38 The Supreme Court has elaborated on the importance of 
specificity in injunctions. In International Longshoremen’s Ass’n. v. 
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n.,80 the court invalidated an order under 
Rule 65(d), remarking, “The most fundamental postulates of our legal 
order forbid the imposition of a penalty for disobeying a command that 
defies comprehension.”81 More recently, the Court explained that “the 
specificity provisions of Rule 65(d) are no mere technical requirements” 
                                                                                                                       
1773679, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Jul. 7, 2005) (stating only, “Defendant is enjoined 
from any further misuse of plaintiff's trademark”); Harvic Intern. Ltd. v. Galaxy 
Fashions, Inc., No. 03CIV3429RLE, 2005 WL 1338035, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 7, 
2005) (enjoining defendant from using “any colorable imitation” of plaintiff’s 
mark). 
76 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (emphasis added). 
77 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2941 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2005. 
78 See generally Note and Comment, Nebulous Injunctions, 23 MICH. L. REV. 53 
(1924); Note and Comment, Nebulous Injunctions, 19 MICH. L. REV. 83 (1920). 
79 WRIGHT, supra note 79, § 2955. 
80 389 U.S. 64 (1967). 
81 Id. at 76. 
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but rather prevent unfairness in the imposition of orders too vague to be 
followed.82  
¶39 The proper use of Rule 65(d) is beneficial to both trademark 
holders and alleged trademark infringers. As for the former, courts can 
use the rule to invalidate vague and unspecific portions of injunctive 
orders that provide infringers with a loophole. The Second Circuit 
recently did just that in Weight Watchers International v. Luigino’s Inc.83 
Weight Watchers registered the term “Points” in connection with a 
particular weight loss program. 84  The defendant manufactured frozen 
food, and on its packaging specified how many points its meals would be 
worth under the Weight Watchers system. 85  The defendant did not, 
however, obtain permission to do so.86 The district court found that the 
defendant’s packaging was likely to confuse customers, who would 
believe “that Weight Watchers had assigned the [points] to or otherwise 
endorsed . . . the products.”87 The court therefore enjoined the defendant 
from using the packaging but also included an ill-defined statement that 
the defendant could “convey accurate factual information concerning the 
[point] values of products” so long as it stated that the defendant itself 
had “calculated such values.” 88  Defendant modified its packaging by 
placing a small disclaimer that stated, “[t]he number of winning points 
provided here has been calculated by Michelina’s . . . .” 89  Weight 
Watchers moved to modify the original injunction to cover the new 
packaging, but the district court declined to do so. 90  On appeal, the 
Second Circuit found no need to modify the original injunction to 
include the new packaging because the escape clause provided for by the 
district court was too vague to withstand Rule 65(d).91 The provision of 
the injunction did not enjoin any action and was “entirely 
hypothetical.”92 
¶40 Courts have also used Rule 65(d) to protect alleged infringers 
from overly broad93 and insufficiently specific injunctions. For example, 
the Eleventh Circuit invalidated an order that enjoined “using trade dress 
                                                     
82 Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974). 
83 Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Luigino’s, Inc., 423 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2005). 





89 Id. at 140. 
90 Id. at 141. 
91 Id. at 142. 
92 Id. 
93 See, e.g., Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 146 F.3d 
350 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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for bank check products which [sic] is confusingly similar to the trade 
dress or overall appearance of plaintiff's . . . products or is likely to cause 
confusion therewith . . . .”94 The use of the term “confusingly similar” 
offered no guidance about the actual acts the defendant needed to refrain 
from doing.95 
¶41 Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit later departed from its sound 
methodology. In 2001, the court upheld an injunctive order against a 
challenge under Rule 65(d) that enjoined defendant from “using any 
logo, trade name, trademark or servicemark which [sic] may be 
calculated to represent falsely that the services or products of defendants 
are affiliated, connected or associated with [plaintiff]; . . . otherwise 
infringing on the ‘Coolmail’ mark; [and] unfairly competing with 
Planetary Motion . . . .”96 The court justified its conclusion by noting that 
it would not apply Rule 65(d) “rigidly.” Rather, it would “determine the 
propriety of an injunctive order by inquiring into whether the parties 
subject thereto understand their obligations under the order.” 97  
Nevertheless, the court gave no indication of how it planned to conduct 
such an inquiry, and in fact there is no reasonable way to conduct it. If 
the inquiry is based on purely the subjective understanding of the parties, 
the defendant’s challenge to the specificity of the order powerfully 
suggests that it fails to comprehend its import. Moreover, even if based 
on an objective reading, this order should fail; for the court itself was not 
quite sure: defendant “likely will not violate the injunction if it 
completely ceases the use of ‘Coolmail’ in connection with e-mail 
services or markets related thereto.” 98  To enjoin a defendant from 
“otherwise infringing” a mark or “unfairly competing” with the plaintiff 
is by no means a reasonably detailed description of the acts sought to be 
restrained by the injunction. Under any sensible reading of the rule, this 
order should have been vacated. 
¶42 The Eleventh Circuit is not alone, however, in the assault on the 
vitality of Rule 65(d) in trademark disputes. The Seventh Circuit has 
complained that “[t]here is a limit to what words can convey,” and Rule 
65(d) “does not require the impossible.” 99  Using this rhetorically 
appealing but substantively bankrupt logic, the court upheld an 
injunction that prohibited the defendant from using any “colorable 
                                                     
94 John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 984 (11th Cir. 
1983). 
95 Id. at 985. 
96 Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1205 n.31 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
97 Id. at 1203. 
98 Id. at 1205 (emphasis added). 
99 Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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imitation” of plaintiff’s registered logo.100 Although the court claimed 
that defendant failed to provide “a formulation that would have given it 
better notice”101 of what was being enjoined, Rule 65(d) imposes no 
requirement on the defendant to do the work of the district courts.102  A 
defendant appeals under Rule 65(d) because it fails to comprehend from 
the order what it can and cannot do; to require the defendant to then 
explain the very thing it cannot ascertain is ludicrous. The logo at issue 
in this case involved a goose and a particular style of typeface. 103  
Perhaps the district court’s order intended to enjoin the defendant from 
using any logo with a goose, or perhaps any bird, or maybe only 
waterfowl, or possibly it really turns on the bird’s posture. Indeed, there 
is no way to know because the term “colorable imitation” is an empty 
phrase that gives no meaningful guidance to an enjoined party. While 
Judge Easterbrook waxed poetic about the inability of words to describe 
the “variousness of experience,”104 the defendant simply wanted to know 
what sorts of birds it could and could not use in its everyday business. 
While the defendant in this case may not have offered (and was not 
required by the rule to offer) any alternative formulations, specifying 
what sorts of birds and bird-stances were off-limits is certainly not the 
“prolix imprecise standards”105 the court sought to avoid. 
¶43 No one is suggesting that Rule 65(d) requires courts to lay out 
with perfect precision every conceivable action from which the 
defendant must abstain. Nevertheless, with well over half a million 
words in the English language, it is ridiculous to think our judges cannot 
do better than “colorable imitation.” 
CONCLUSION 
¶44 Whether it is the applicability of tax principles to e-commerce106 
or of the National Labor Relations Act to employee blogging,107 the law 
must adapt as the world changes. Change, however, cannot justify the 
haphazard disregard of the traditional principles of equity. Injunctions 
have gone from one of the most extraordinary remedies in the American 
                                                     
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1432. 
102 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
103 Scandia Down, 772 F.2d at 1425. 
104 Id. at 1432. 
105 Id. 
106 See Walter J. Baudier, Internet Sales Taxes from Borders to Amazon: How 
Long Before All of Your Purchases Are Taxed? 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
0005 (2006). 
107 See Katherine Scott, When is Employee Blogging Protected by Section 7 of 
the NLRA?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (forthcoming May 2006). 
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judicial system with strict specificity requirements to the default order in 
trademark litigation where courts can essentially enjoin defendants from 
activities as broad and nondescript as “infringing.” The slow and 
regretful evisceration of the traditional ex ante protections afforded by 
the four-factor injunction test has rendered injunctive relief almost 
automatic in trademark disputes, and the subsequent over-issuance of 
injunctions has led to a decline in the specificity of the orders.  
¶45 Injunctions will likely remain the typical remedy for trademark 
disputes, but for the very reason that there will be so many of them, 
judges should exercise the utmost care. A thoughtful consideration of all 
four traditional factors should lead judges to compose more equitable 
orders, which in turn should make them more specific and helpful. 
Concomitantly, appellate courts should more vigilantly enforce the ex 
post protections of Rule 65(d) to ensure clarity in the myriad injunctive 
orders issued in trademark litigation. Procedure profoundly affects 
substance; we must not let unnecessary presumptions erode much needed 
precision. 
  
